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THE PORTRAIT OF HOMER IN STRABO’S GEOGRAPHY
lawrence kim
trabo’s geography, as anyone who has perused it will know, is
suffused with a profound, nearly obsessive, interest in Homer.1 The
desire to demonstrate Homer’s knowledge of  geographical informa-
tion at every turn (even where it seems prima facie unlikely) is matched
only by the determination with which Strabo “solves” notorious problems
of  Homeric geography such as the location of  Nestor’s Pylos or the identity
of  the “Ethiopians divided in twain” visited by Poseidon.2 Strabo’s concen-
tration on such arcana, often to the exclusion of  more properly “geographical”
material, has understandably exasperated many modern readers with different
ideas about what constitutes geography. On the other hand, the overwhelm-
ing geographical focus of  his Homeric criticism has rendered his extensive
comments of  only passing interest to scholars of  ancient poetic criticism; at
best they provide evidence for the methodological principles of  a writer “con-
ditioned by the dominant position of  Homer’s poetry in Greek life to regard
Homer as knowledgeable and trustworthy in matters of  geography also.”3
Recently, however, a more sophisticated understanding of  the historical
(or temporal) dimensions of  Strabo’s geographical project has better inte-
grated his Homeric fixation into the work as a whole.4 We see now that his
reverence for Homer is linked to the importance of  historical memory (palaia;
mnhvmh: 1.1.16) within his notion of  geography.5 If, as Katherine Clarke
writes, “the stories told about the past were precisely what gave a place its
present identity [to Strabo],” the stories told by Homer would naturally be
1. Homer is mentioned in the Geography’s opening paragraph, and nearly the entire first book is taken
up with discussions of  Homer’s geographical knowledge. The books on Greece (7–9) and northwestern
Asia Minor (12–13) are closely tied to discussions of  the Catalogues of  the Greeks and Trojans in Iliad 2.
For an introductory overview, see Dueck 2000, 31–40; Kahles (1976) surveys Strabo’s numerous Homeric
citations.
2. Nestor’s Pylos: 8.3.24–29 (see Biraschi 1994); Ethiopians divided in twain: 1.2.24–28.
3. Schenkeveld 1976, 63–64; cf. Engels 1999, 115–20. Schenkeveld is one of  the few who have attempted
to analyze Strabo’s method of  interpreting Homer in Book 1 in any detail. Very little work has been done
on the specifics of  Strabo’s Homeric interpretation elsewhere in the Geography; a notable exception is the
important series of  articles by Biraschi (1992, 1994, 2000).
4. Van Paassen (1957, 1–32) anticipates much of  the recent work; Biraschi 1988; Clarke 1999, 245–93
(esp. 248–51).
5. A slightly different approach is found in Gabba (1982, 59–61), who sees both Strabo’s “high opinion
of  Homer” and his contemporary Dionysius of  Halicarnassus’ advocacy of  classical models as evidence of
a “classicistic” revival in the Augustan period; cf. Desideri 1999.
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vital to his descriptions of  those places.6 In addition, interest in Homeric
geography could boast of  a healthy intellectual lineage.7 Geographical
problems had always been important to Homeric critics, and conversely a
desire to identify the cities, regions, and peoples of  the heroic age had
informed geographical inquiry from its earliest stages.8 In such a context,
Strabo’s claim that Homer was the founder of  geography and his interest in
defending the accuracy of  the poet’s information become more compre-
hensible, and indeed constitute integral parts of  his project.
In this article, however, I am not so much interested in Strabo’s thoughts
about Homeric poetry or its content (the geographical data he believes it
preserves) as I am in the idiosyncratic and selective portrait of  Homer that
he constructs in order to justify his faith in the poetry’s reliability.9 In
the first part of  this article, I analyze this vision of  Homer as outlined
in Geography 1.1.2 and expanded upon throughout the rest of  Book 1.
Strabo’s Homer is not some Stoic sage, nor the blind and divinely inspired
mendicant of  the biographical tradition, but very much a traveler, historian,
and (no surprise here) geographer who embodies the ideals embraced by
Strabo himself  in his own work and self-image. Furthermore, I want to show
how, just as his geographical project is a conscious extension and reworking
of  his forerunners, Strabo’s construction of  Homer as historian and traveler
(and only incidentally as a poet) arises from his reading of  the “Homer”
articulated at key points in the work of  his great model and predecessor,
Polybius.10 In part two, I turn to his famous debate with Eratosthenes on
Homer’s geographical knowledge, focusing on the important opening section
(1.2.3 5) to show how Strabo’s discussion of  Homer’s didactic concerns
can perhaps be better understood as an extension of  this new portrait of
Homer. Rather than an isolated argument about the purpose of  poetry, this
debate, viewed in a geographical and historiographical context, forms an
essential part of  Strabo’s attempt to cast Homer as the “founder” of  geog-
raphy by defending his erudition and “useful” objectives both characteristics
delineated earlier by Strabo as those of  the ideal geographer.
6. Clarke 1999, 281; cf. Strabo 2.5.17: “And of  these latter attributes [the geographer] should indicate
those which are able to persist for a long time, or else those which, although unable to persist, somehow
possess a certain distinction and fame [aßllwÍ d’ ejpifavneian me;n ejcouvsaÍ tina; kaµ dovxan]; this fame by enduring
[paramevnousa] to later times, makes a work of  man, even when it no longer exists, a kind of  natural attribute
of  a place [trovpon tina; sumfuhÅ]”; cf. also the remarks of  Biraschi (1988).
7. Prontera 1993. As he notes, identifications of  Homeric sites and peoples with their “real” counterparts—
e.g., Scheria with Kerkyra, the Hippomolgi with the Scythians—appear as early as Hesiod and figure frequently
in early prose writers.
8. The Hellenistic period saw a marked increase in scholarship devoted to such topics and the inevitable
debates to which they gave rise. In fact, Strabo is the major source for works such as Apollodorus of  Athens’
commentary on the Catalogue of  Ships or Demetrius of  Scepsis’ thirty-book treatise on the Trojan Cata-
logue, as well as other material testifying to Homer’s significance in Hellenistic cultural and intellectual
discourse; see Pfeiffer 1968, 249–51 and 257–63, respectively, with bibliography.
9. Aujac (1966, 34–36) provides a brief  overview of  Strabo’s picture of  Homer; cf. Dueck 2000, 39.
10. Strabo’s first work was a history (now lost) continuing that of  Polybius (on which see Engels 1999,
59–114 with bibliography), and his Geography is deeply indebted to that author as well. On Polybius’ in-
fluence on Strabo, see Clarke 1999; Engels 1999, 145–65; Dueck 2000, 46–53.
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Strabo’s Homer and Polybius’ Ideal Historian
Homer: The Founder of  Geography
The opening section of  Strabo’s work (1.1.1 23) is simultaneously a defi-
nition and a defense of  his geographical project; it professes to explain what
“geography” is by detailing the sort of  training it requires, what its aims
should be, and what sort of  readers it seeks, but in doing so gradually evolves
into an apology for the treatise in hand, which is “a serious work, worthy of
a philosopher.”11 The initial half  of  this long methodological introduction
(1.1.2 11) is devoted to establishing Homer’s position as the first geographer,
primarily by demonstrating the poet’s knowledge of  “the remote ends [ta;
eßscata] of  the o√koumevnh, what surrounds it [ta; kuvklå], as well as the
regions around the Mediterranean Sea” (1.1.10).12 The far-fetched interpre-
tations of  Homeric poetry that Strabo provides in this section to establish
rather obscure points, such as Homer’s awareness of  Iberia (not mentioned
by name in his poems), or that “by the term aßrktoÍ [the constellation “the
Bear”] . . . he means to;n a˚rktikovn [the northern polar zone],”13 have not en-
deared this section to scholars, but there is more at stake here than initially
meets the eye. After all, the positioning of  an extended treatment of  Homer
right at the beginning of  his work suggests that the importance of  Homer to
the Geography cannot be explained simply as a nod to an illustrious prede-
cessor or an attempt to co-opt a cultural authority for a novel project. In
fact, the entire series of  arguments rests on an explicit, detailed assumption
about what kind of  man Homer was, presented right at the beginning of
Strabo’s discussion and gradually supplemented and clarified throughout
the entire first book. This suggests that Strabo knew very well that proving
Homer’s geographical knowledge was not enough to make him the first
geographer only as an embodiment of  those virtues proper to the geo-
graphical tevcnh can Homer rightly be called its “founder.” In fact, it is via
his description of  Homer that Strabo manages to address a central issue that
he omits from his more explicit discussion of  the “philosophical” nature of
geography, namely, the type of  person a geographer should be.14
But before we go any farther, we should look at Strabo’s sketch of  Homer
(1.1.2):
kaµ prΩton o§ti ojrqΩÍ uÒpeilhvfamen kaµ hJme∂Í kaµ o¥ pro; hJmΩn w•n ejsti kaµ £IpparcoÍ
a˚rchgevthn eπnai thÅÍ gewgrafikhÅÍ ejmpeirÇaÍ £Omhron. o¶Í ou˚ movnon t¬Å kata; th;n poÇhsin
a˚ret¬Å pavntaÍ uÒperbevblhtai tou;Í pavlai kaµ tou;Í u§steron, a˚lla; scedovn ti kaµ t¬Å kata;
11. 1.1.23. I discuss the second half  (1.1.12–23) of  this methodological preface below, in the second part
of  this article. Translations of  Strabo are taken, often modified, from Jones’ Loeb edition of  Books 1–2
(1917) and, for 1.2.3–9, the more fluent rendition of  Russell and Winterbottom (1970, 300–305). For the
Greek I use the recent edition of  Radt (2002).
12. See Aujac 1966, 20–26, for a succinct overview of  this section.
13. Iberia: 1.1.4; the Bear: 1.1.6. The latter is part of  Strabo’s solution to the problem (also solved by
Arist. Poet. 1461a20) caused by Homer’s claim (Il. 18.489; Od. 5.275) that the Bear alone of  all the con-
stellations never sets.
14. Siviglia (1987, 48) sees in Strabo’s grouping of  Homer, Anaximander, and Hecataeus as the first
geographers an idea of  geography “as the expression of  a fundamental attitude of  the human spirit.”
Lawrence Kim366
to;n bÇon ejmpeirÇç to;n politikovn, a˚f’ h•Í ou˚ movnon perµ ta;Í pravxeiÍ ejspouvdasen ejke∂noÍ
o§pwÍ o§ti pleÇstaÍ gnoÇh kaµ parad∫sei to∂Í u§steron ejsomevnoiÍ, a˚lla; kaµ ta; perµ tou;Í
tovpouÍ touvÍ te kaq’ e§kasta kaµ tou;Í kata; suvmpasan th;n o√koumevnhn ghÅn te kaµ qavlat
tan: ou˚ ga;r a˙n mevcri tΩn ejscavtwn au˚thÅÍ peravtwn a˚fÇketo t¬Å mnhvm¬ kuvklå perii∫n.
I say that both I and those before me, one of  whom was Hipparchus himself, correctly
regard Homer as the founder of  the practice of  geography. For Homer has surpassed
everyone, ancient and modern, not only in the excellence of  his poetry, but also, I might
say, in his experience of  all that pertains to public life. And from this experience he
eagerly pursued not only public affairs to the end that he might learn of  as many of
them as possible and give an account of  them to those who came after him, but also the
things about places, both on an individual basis and with regard to the whole o√koumevnh,
both land and sea. For otherwise he would not have gone to its farthest borders, encom
passing the whole of  it in his description.
We should note several things here. First of  all, Strabo distinguishes
Homer’s abilities as a poet (a˚reth; kata; th;n poÇhsin) from his experience of
public life (hJ kata; to;n bÇon ejmpeirÇa to;n politikovn). With poetic “excellence”
bracketed,15 Strabo concentrates on Homer’s other assets: he is a man well
versed in the political life, who is keen to investigate “deeds” (perµ ta;Í
pravxeiÍ) in order to learn about as many of  them as possible and pass his
knowledge down to future generations. And of  course, included among the
things to be learned are geographical matters (ta; perµ tou;Í tovpouÍ) under-
stood in the broadest sense. The Homer we see fleshed out here is not an
inspired poet or inventive raconteur, but a learned, intrepid explorer who
has “gone to the farthest borders” of  the world.
Strabo’s initial portrait of  Homer emphasizes three interwoven qualities
that will be reiterated and further elaborated in the course of  his discussion:
(a) his ejmpeirÇa, or experience, of  life, from which he developed (b) his eager-
ness to learn, and (c) his willingness to travel great distances to learn about
“deeds” and “places.” In particular, these last two speak to a certain geo-
graphical desire that lies at the heart of  Strabo’s conception of  Homer, often
stressed throughout the Prolegomena, and rendered more notable by the use
of  rare and unusual terminology. In 1.1.10, for instance, Strabo points to
Homer’s alleged description of  the tides as “another proof  of  the same zealous
curiosity” (thÅÍ au˚thÅÍ filopragmosuvnhÍ) that he had alluded to a few pages
before, and at 1.2.29 Strabo speaks of  the poet’s “love of  learning” (to; fileÇ-
dhmon), coupling it this time with his “love of  travel” (to; filevkdhmon), using
two words that are unique to this text.16 Strabo establishes the parameters
of  the knowledge to which this desire is directed as he discusses Odysseus’
wanderings (1.2.13):
For we do not demand [zhtouÅmen] that the poet should have inquired accurately into each
particular [a˚kribΩÍ e§kasta puqevsqai], nor demand accuracy from him [par’ ejkeÇnou to;
15. On this term, see below and Biraschi 1984.
16. fileÇdhmon appears only in Strabo, here and at 1.1.23, 1.2.8 (twice), and 3.4.19; filevkdhmon only
here and at 2.3.5. The astrologer Vettius Valens (second century c.e.?) uses the cognates filekdhmhthvÍ and
filekdhmÇa.
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a˚kribevÍ]; yet even so, we surely are not entitled to assume that he composed the story
[rJayåde∂n] without having inquired at all [mhde;n pepusmevnon] about the wandering,
either as to where or how it occurred [mhvq’ o§pou mhvq’ o§pwÍ gegevnhtai].
The inclusion of  o§pwÍ in addition to o§pou reminds us that Homer’s “learn-
ing by inquiry” (pepusmevnon) includes not only identifying the location of
Odysseus’ travels, but also ascertaining “how” the wanderings occurred.
Homer, as Strabo’s initial portrait (1.1.2) had already asserted, is concerned
with pravxeiÍ in addition to tovpoi a pairing that corresponds with Strabo’s
own professed interest in both geographical detail and the historical “deeds”
that took place in the sites that he discusses.
We see a similar emphasis on inquiry into both deeds and places when
Strabo turns to the poetry to prove the poet’s love of  learning and travel:
“the poets show that the wisest [fronimwtavtouÍ] heroes were those who visited
many places and wandered [tou;Í a˚podhmhvsantaÍ pollacouÅ kaµ planhqevntaÍ];
for they hold it as a great thing to have ‘seen the cities and known the minds
of  many men’ ” (pollΩn a˚nqr∫pwn √de∂n aßstea kaµ novon gnΩnai, Od. 1.3).17
So Nestor, according to Strabo, “boasts [semnuvnetai] of  having lived among
the Lapiths” at Iliad 1.270, while Menelaus evinces pride in his travels at
Odyssey 4.83, and often takes care to mention “the distinctive peculiarity”
(to; √dÇwma) of  the places he has visited.18 In each of  these citations, the con-
nection between travel and knowledge or wisdom is emphasized; the heroes
demonstrate an interest both in foreign lands and in what occurs there. In a
final example, Strabo claims that “it is likely [e√kovÍ] that Heracles is spoken
of  [by Homer] as ‘familiar with great deeds’ (megavlwn ejpiÇstora eßrgwn,
Od. 21.26) from his wide experience and inquiry” (a˚po; thÅÍ pollhÅÍ ejmpeirÇaÍ
te kaµ ¥storÇaÍ lecqhÅnai, 1.1.16). Note here, after the citations of  the geo-
graphical interests of  heroes, how Strabo extends the connotation of  the
Homeric hapax ejpiÇstora beyond the notion of  ¥storÇa (inquiry) to encom-
pass also the ejmpeirÇa that he assumes lies behind Heracles’ knowledge.19
Inferring Homer’s character from the sentiments expressed in his poetry, as
Strabo does here, was a common method of  ancient biographical inquiry,20
a fact that should remind us that Strabo’s vision of  Homer as traveler and in-
vestigator was not completely novel.21 Strabo himself  claims that “all those
who have written about Homer’s life testify” (marturouÅsin o§soi to;n bÇon
17. 1.1.16. Translations of  Homer are those of  Lattimore. Schol. E ad Od. 1.3 Dindorf  echoes Strabo’s
interpretation of  this passage; after explaining that there are three types of  nouÅ Í (qewrhtikovÍ, fusikovÍ, and
pragmatikovÍ), the scholiast defines the “practical” sort as “whenever someone, having seen many cities
and countries and thereby becoming experienced [eßmpeiroÍ], obtains knowledge [gnΩsiÍ] from them; for
knowledge is obtained from experience [ejk thÅÍ ejmpeirÇaÍ].”
18. 1.1.16: “So too Menelaus: ‘I roamed over Cyprus, Phoenicia and Egypt, and came to the Ethiopians,
Sidonians, Erembians and Libya’ [Od. 4.83].” Among the peculiarities are the birth cycles of  sheep in
Libya, the herbs of  Egypt (Od. 4.229), and the gates of  Egyptian Thebes (Il. 9.383). Van Paassen (1957,
17–18) has noted Strabo’s interest in the “particularity” (hJ √diovthÍ) of  a place as well as its central im-
portance to his notion of  geography.
19. The meaning of  ejpiÇstora is still debated; cf. Russo et al. 1992, 151.
20. See Lefkowitz 1981 and Fairweather 1974, 1983.
21. And of  course the association of  travel and knowledge was a familiar one in Greek culture at large;
Solon’s journeys are a good example.
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a˚nagravfousi, 1.2.29) to his eagerness for travel and knowledge, and the
Homeric Vitae bear traces of  such interest.22 The Herodotean life, for ex-
ample, tells us that a certain Mentes (intriguingly described as polui?stwr)
allowed Homer to accompany him on his ship, and that “wherever they
landed, [Homer] saw clearly all of  the local customs and he learned of
them by inquiry” (kaµ o§pou eJkavstote a˚fÇkoito pavnta ta; ejpic∫ria diewraÅto,
kaµ ¥storevwn ejpunqavneto).23 The emphasis not only on travel, but on Homer’s
desire to investigate, question, and learn things closely parallels the image
Strabo provides us, as does the choice of  vocabulary. The Vita of  Proclus
suggests that such notions were probably derived from the Odyssey’s
breadth of  geographical scope (Proclus Chrestomathia, pp. 101.21 102.2
Allen):
It is evident from Homer’s detailed knowledge of  places that he traveled over a great
part of  the inhabited world [polla; de; ejpelhluqw;Í mevrh thÅÍ o√koumevnhÍ ejk thÅÍ polu
peirÇaÍ tΩn tovpwn euJrÇsketai]. It may further be deduced from this that there was
plenty of  money at his disposal. For long journeys involve great expenditure, all the
more so in that period when it was not possible for everyone to sail without risk, and
when men could not easily visit just any people they pleased.24
Proclus’ deadpan “economic” inference also shows us that very different
conclusions could be drawn from similar starting points.25 Even, then, if
the idea of  an intrepid Homer is not particularly new, what is quite striking
is Strabo’s radical transformation of  this minor biographical datum into
the focal point of  Homer’s life and character. Furthermore, the rest of
Strabo’s vision betrays a rather deliberate neglect of  the more celebrated
aspects of  the poet’s life. In popular tradition, of  course, Homer was a blind
poet, often poor, occasionally divinely inspired, who wandered the Medi-
terranean literally singing for his supper a picture considerably at odds
with the one Strabo puts on display.26 And while his travels and inquiry are
mentioned in the two Lives discussed above, the shorter biographies ignore
them. More significantly, other texts that defend Homeric passages, geo-
graphical or otherwise, such as Heraclitus’ Homeric Problems (an allegorical
defense of  Homer) and Pseudo-Plutarch’s On the Life and Poetry of Homer
(a systematic demonstration of  Homer as the source of  all knowledge), make
no mention of  this kind of  biographical detail.
Polybius, Strabo, and Homer the Historian
If  the Vitae and the usual suspects of  Homeric criticism fail to provide a
relevant context for Strabo’s Homeric portrait, a glance at the historio-
22. Aujac and Lasserre 1969, 197. While the Vitae as we have them most likely postdate Strabo, much
of  their content derives from a tradition that extends as far back as the sixth century b.c.e.
23. Ps.-Hdt. Vit. Hom. 6. On Homer and his travels in the Lives, see Fairweather 1974, 235–36, and
1983, 326–27 (on the general issue of  travel in ancient biographies of  poets).
24. Translation in Fairweather 1974, 236; not mentioned in the list provided by Aujac and Lasserre
1969, 197. Fairweather (1974, 236) notes the Thucydidean tinge of  Proclus’ argumentation here. This Vita
is much later than Strabo, but I quote it here as an example of  a way of  thinking about Homer that was
presumably conceivable much earlier.
25. Cf. Polybius’ remarkably parallel comments at 3.58, discussed below.
26. See Graziosi 2002, 125–63, on Homer’s blindness, poverty, and divinity.
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graphical tradition proves more illuminating; after all, historians since
Herodotus had emphasized the importance of  travel and personal investiga-
tion. But the most direct parallels are found in Polybius, who was the first
to systematically discuss such activities as historiographical prerequisites.
While Strabo’s new Homer stands in contrast to traditional biographical
portraits of  Homer, his salient qualities of  effort, political experience, and
interest in inquiry and knowledge accord remarkably well with the charac-
teristics required of  the proper historian as prescribed by Polybius, who
was, after all, one of  Strabo’s primary sources and models. And although it
is well known that Polybius took a great interest in Homeric geography (as
evidenced, in a rather circular fashion, by the fragments of  Book 34 pre-
served by Strabo),27 surprisingly little attention has been paid to Homer’s
presence in his methodological discussions of  historiography or to the im-
portance of  Polybius’ Homer to that of  Strabo.
First of  all, let us take a look at Polybius’ famous delineation of  the three
essential components of  pragmatikh; ¥storÇa.28 Guido Schepens has pro-
posed that this tripartite definition (in contrast to the later bipartite division
according to historical technique at 12.27) is based on an evaluation of  the
historian’s proper disposition or character.29 This is, of  course, the very aspect
of  Homer emphasized by Strabo, and the similarities between this descrip-
tion of  the qualities necessary for a historian and Strabo’s characterization
of  Homer’s attributes in 1.1.2 are striking on both the conceptual and termi-
nological level (12.25e.1):
. . . tΩn de; merΩn au˚thÅÍ eJno;Í me;n oßntoÍ touÅ  perµ th;n ejn to∂Í uÒpomnhvmasi polupragmo
suvnhn kaµ th;n paravqesin thÅÍ ejk touvtwn u§lhÍ, eJtevrou de; touÅ  perµ th;n qevan tΩn povlewn
kaµ tΩn tovpwn perÇ te potamΩn kaµ limevnwn kaµ kaqovlou tΩn kata; ghÅn kaµ kata; qavlattan
√diwmavtwn kaµ diasthmavtwn, trÇtou de; touÅ  perµ ta;Í pravxeiÍ ta;Í politikavÍ . . .
. . . the first part of  it [history] being the industrious study of  written sources and a
comparison of  their contents, the second the survey of  cities, places, rivers, harbors and
generally the peculiarities of  land and sea and the distances between them, and the third
that concerning political actions . . . 30
To Polybius’ first and third “parts” perµ th;n polupragmosuvnhn (concerning
eagerness, or, industriousness) in matters of  written evidence, and perµ ta;Í
pravxeiÍ ta;Í politikavÍ we can compare Strabo’s praise of  the poet’s filo-
pragmosuvnh (a rare word equivalent in this context to polupragmosuvnh) as
well as his insistence on how Homer “had busied himself  about deeds” (perµ
ta;Í pravxeiÍ ejspouvdasen) and his “experience of  political life” (t¬Å kata;
to;n bÇon ejmpeirÇç to;n politikovn).31 As for the second, geographical, part of
27. Vercruysse 1990 examines Polybius’ Homeric citations and his critique of  Homeric geography in
Book 34. The extent to which Strabo is dependent upon Polybius’ Book 34 continues to be debated; see
Walbank 1956–79, 3:577–79, and most recently Engels 1999, 164–65. 
28. On the meaning of  this much-debated term, so important to Polybius, see the discussion in Sacks
1981, 178–86.
29. Schepens 1974, following the division laid out in Isnardi 1955; cf. Schepens 1990.
30. Translations of  Polybius are from Paton’s Loeb, with modifications, and with reference to Walbank
1956–79. Greek is cited from Büttner-Wobst’s Teubner.
31. filopragmosuvnh, 1.1.10; political experience, 1.1.2; see discussion above, p. 366.
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history, note the close verbal parallels between Polybius’ text perµ th;n
qevan tΩn povlewn kaµ tΩn tovpwn perÇ te potamΩn kaµ limevnwn kaµ kaqovlou
tΩn kata; ghÅn kaµ kata; qavlattan √diwmavtwn and Strabo’s description of
Homer’s interest in ta; perµ tou;Í tovpouÍ touvÍ te kaq’ e§kasta kaµ tou;Í kata;
suvmpasan th;n o√koumevnhn ghÅn te kaµ qavlattan (matters of  places, both in-
dividually and with regard to the whole inhabited world, land and sea).32
Strabo, whether consciously or not, appears to have fashioned Homer as
a historian who stands in conformity with Polybius’ prescriptive guidelines,
so that in Strabo’s new vision of  the genealogy of  the geographical tevcnh
Homer is paradoxically constituted, after the fact, as having anticipated and
served as the model for Polybius’ ideal historian. But Strabo’s re-inscription
of  Homer into the historiographical tradition has an even deeper resonance
with Polybius’ work. Homer also figures prominently in other Polybian dis-
cussions of  three essential historiographical issues ejmpeirÇa, polupragmo-
suvnh, and travel that we have identified as central to Strabo’s vision of  the
poet, a correspondence that suggests that Strabo’s Homer perhaps owes a more
extensive debt to the Homer of  the Histories.
As is widely recognized, ejmpeirÇa (experience) is one of  the Polybian
historian’s most important assets.33 For Polybius “it is neither possible for
a man without experience [ejmpeirÇan] of  military matters to write well about
what goes on in a war, nor for one unversed [to;n mh; pepeiramevnon] in the
practice and circumstances of  politics to write well on that subject” (12.25g.1).
Historians without such experience (Timaeus, naturally, is the primary target
here) not only are prone to frequent errors of  fact, but also remain unable to
“arouse the interest of  their readers” because their writing lacks a certain
“vividness” (eßmfasiÍ, 12.25h.4), likely to be found among only those his-
torians “who have played some part in affairs themselves and made this
aspect of  history their own” (to∂Í di’ au˚tΩn peporeumevnoiÍ tΩn pragmavtwn
touÅto to; mevroÍ peripepoihmevnoiÍ thÅÍ ¥storÇaÍ, 12.25h.6). 34 Vividness in
writing about politics, war, or even domestic matters, then, usually arises
from participation in, and familiarity with, these activities, even if  not nec-
essarily in the specific events one was actually writing about.35 Such a stance
is in keeping with Polybius’ general privileging of  political and military
experience for those writing history, but when he goes on to provide an
example of  such a man, he turns not to a historian, but to Homer (12.25i.1):
The poet is sufficient proof  that what I am saying is by no means impossible [o§ti de; to;
legovmenon ou˚k a˚duvnaton, ¥kano;n uÒpovdeigma pro;Í pÇstin oJ poihthvÍ], for in his poetry
32. Note the similar language at Strabo 10.3.5, where he specifically mentions Polybius.
33. On the importance of  experience in Greek historiography, see Marincola 1997, 133–36 (and further
pp. 71–75 on Polybius). Both he (p. 73) and Schepens 1970, 173–75, in a stronger formulation, note Polybius’
use of  the term ejmpeirÇa in a new, important way, tied specifically to the historian’s skill in investigation.
34. On the term eßmfasiÍ as used by Polybius, see Schepens 1975.
35. “Hence our predecessors considered that historical memoirs should possess such vividness [de∂n ejn
to∂Í uÒpomnhvmasin uÒpavrcein ejmfavseiÍ] as to make one exclaim when the author deals with political affairs
that he necessarily had taken part in politics and had experience [pe∂ran eßschke] in matters of  that sort,
when he deals with war that he had been in the field and risked his life, and when he deals with private life
that he had reared children and lived with a wife, and so on regarding the other parts of  life” (12.25h.5).
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one sees much of  this kind of  vividness (par’ å•  polu;  to; thÅÍ toiauvthÍ ejmfavsewÍ ≥doi tiÍ
a˙n uÒpavrcon].
The implication here is that Homer’s poetry has vividness because Homer was
familiar, as all historians should be, with ta; pravgmata, and versed in worldly
and domestic life in short, because he possessed ejmpeirÇa.
A short while later, the discussion has moved on to polupragmosuvnh
(literally, “curiosity,” but here meaning something closer to “personal in-
vestigation”), which “requires great labor and expense [pollhÅÍ talaipwrÇaÍ
kaµ dapavnhÍ] . . . but is the most important part of  history [megistovn ejsti
mevroÍ thÅÍ ¥storÇaÍ].”36 In support of  his claim, Polybius quotes passages from
Ephorus and Theopompus asserting the superiority of  knowledge gained from
physical presence. But his third authority is Homer (12.27.10):
The poet has spoken even more vividly [ejmfantik∫teron] on this aspect than the others.
When he wishes to set before us the qualities that the man of  action [to;n aßndra to;n
pragmatikovn] should possess, he presents the character [to; provswpon] of  Odysseus in
these words: “Tell me Muse, of  the man of  many ways, who was driven far journeys”
[Od. 1.1], and further on, “many were they whose cities he saw, whose minds he learned
of  and many the pains he suffered in his spirit on the wide sea” [Od. 1.2 3] and again:
“For I had much to suffer: the wars of  men; hard crossing of  the big waters” [Od. 8.183].
“It appears to me,” Polybius gravely concludes, “that the dignity of  history
demands such a man” (12.28.1). Here, as previously, Homer is implicitly a
man versed in the same fields and sharing the qualities of  the best historians
of  the past. While in 12.25, Polybius had turned to Homer as an example
of  a historian who achieved an eßmfasiÍ tΩn pragmavtwn that can only be
produced ejk thÅÍ au˚topaqeÇaÍ, locating in the poet the consummate “ex-
perienced” writer, he here uses Homer as the crowning example of  a series
of  historians who emphasize the need for personal inquiry into political and
military affairs. Homer not only is a model for historiographical practice,
but also theoretically reflects on this practice in his descriptions of  Odysseus.37
Homer’s remarks, however, are slightly different from those of  Ephorus and
Theopompus, who focus on the importance of  presence for historical inquiry.38
The sense from the Odyssey passages is rather that polupragmosuvnh requires
hardship and effort and is closely tied to travel, recalling the references to
personal investigation’s “great labor and expense” with which Polybius had
begun his discussion.
This emphasis on the travel and effort involved in proper historical inquiry
appears again in Polybius’ well-known excursus on geography in 3.56.39
36. 12.27.6. Again the target is Timaeus and his propensity to read books instead of  interrogating wit-
nesses. As if  to reiterate the importance of  polupragmosuvnh, Polybius repeats the term (or its cognates)
four times in chap. 27.
37. Here Polybius shares with Strabo and the biographers the widespread assumption that Homer’s descrip-
tions of  characters could be used as evidence of  his own beliefs. Note also that Polybius quotes the very
same lines of  the Odyssey as Strabo does in 1.1.16, to prove the same point. These lines, however, are
frequently cited in antiquity and do not necessarily suggest any direct connection between the two authors.
38. See Schepens 1970 on Ephorus’ statement.
39. On Polybius and geography, see Pédech 1964, 588–96; Walbank 1972, 114–29; and the important
analysis of  Clarke 1999, 79–97.
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Although he advocates postponing systematic discussion to a separate book
(i.e., 34), Polybius insists that no other field is in as much need of  correction
or has enjoyed such an increase in knowledge (a sentiment echoed by Strabo
at, e.g., 1.2.1 and 2.5.12). He demonstrates this through a brief  speculative
description of  the difficulties of  early exploration somewhat reminiscent
of  Thucydides’ “Archaeology”: in earlier times, very few Greeks tried to
“inquire into the ends of  the world” (polupragmone∂n ta; kata; ta;Í ejscatiavÍ)
because of  the danger. If  someone had reached “the boundaries of  the world”
(pro;Í ta; pevrata thÅÍ o√koumevnhÍ), he could not have seen things with his
own eyes, and even if  he had seen them, he couldn’t have received accurate
information about those things due to his inability to speak the local language.
Moreover, even were he to have obtained trustworthy data, he would have
most likely embellished these facts with monsters and marvels. But, Polybius
concludes, we should not criticize those early writers, but praise them for
how much they did manage to learn in less-than-ideal circumstances. Leaving
aside Polybius’ remarkable rhetorical argument and its dizzying series of
counterfactuals, it is difficult, in the light of  all that we have been discuss-
ing (especially Proclus’ Homeric Vita), not to imagine Homer as the primary
object of  this ambivalent apology. Or we might say at least that it would
have been difficult for Strabo, as he was reading this passage, not to have
done so after all, Strabo’s initial portrait uses similar language in empha-
sizing Homer’s journeys to the ends and boundaries of  the world (mevcri tΩn
ejscavtwn au˚thÅÍ [sc. thÅÍ o√koumevnhÍ] peravtwn a˚fÇketo).
Immediately after this passage, Polybius offers a testimonial of  his own
intrepid nature, characterizing himself  as a traveling geographical inquirer
engaged in a quest for knowledge: “It was in fact with this express object
[to give an accurate description of  the world] that I underwent the dangers
and hardships of  making journeys through Africa, Spain, and Gaul, and
voyages on the sea which adjoins these countries on their western side”
(3.59.7 8). F. W. Walbank has plausibly suggested that Polybius is casting
himself  in a Homeric mode here and that the Odyssean model of  a wise
wanderer of  distant lands, experienced in war and strategy, resonated with
Polybius’ self-conception.40 One could add that the emphasis here on “dangers
and hardships” recalls (or foreshadows) the “severe labor and great expense”
required by a historian’s “personal investigation” evidenced by the Odyssey
quotations of  12.27.
As even this brief  treatment reveals, for Polybius, experience, personal
investigation, travel, and industriousness are closely linked none can stand
on its own (even autopsy, that object of  every historian’s desire, remains
useless in Polybius’ eyes if  employed by an inexperienced man). The
concept of  personal investigation so highly praised in 12.27 naturally binds
together the geographer and the historian (polupragmone∂n, above and at
3.59.4). But I hope to have demonstrated that Polybius’ idea of  the proper
historian is constantly informed, implicitly or explicitly, by the figure of
40. Walbank 1948, 181, somewhat modified in Walbank 1972, 51–52.
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Homer, even if  he is often in the background. In his aspect as a historian,
Homer exemplifies the qualities that Polybius holds as essential to his own
work.41
Strabo’s depiction of  Homer in 1.1 thus stems from his reading of  Poly-
bius not in the sense of  using him as a “source,” but inasmuch as Strabo’s
sense of  historical and geographical inquiry owes so much to the Polybian
sensibility.42 Strabo builds his Homer upon the hints and traces found in the
Polybian text; he makes explicit and expands upon what was only (uncon-
sciously?) suggested in Polybius’ work that Homer was the man who em-
bodied all of  the characteristics of  the ideal historian and geographer before
they had even been enumerated and systematized by Polybius himself.43 In
particular, he seems to have come to the conclusion that Homer’s excellence
lay first and foremost in the kind of  person he was, marked by the historio-
graphical desire that led him to experience life, be a man of  action, and spend
considerable effort and expense in travel, all in the pursuit of  knowledge.44
To bring the interplay of  Strabo, Homer, Polybius, and geography to a
fitting climax, we might conclude this section with a glance at Strabo’s
description of  his own qualifications as a geographer in the so-called
second introduction at 2.5, a reminiscence of  Polybius’ geographical self-
characterization at 3.59, which we have just examined. Strabo boasts that
“one could not find another geographer who has traveled over much more
than I have,”45 and he backs up his assertion with an itinerary of  precisely
where he has traveled (2.5.11).46 From this declaration of  his own love of
travel Strabo turns to his love of  knowledge (Homer’s to; filevkdhmon and to;
fileÇdhmon). Just as he had imagined Homer inquiring after places and events
the poet was unable to witness himself, Strabo argues that geographers
(glossed as “serious students” o¥ filomaqe∂Í a favorite term of  Polybius
for his ideal audience) must rely, not only on autopsia, but also on second-
hand witnesses (2.5.11):
However, the greater part of  our material both they and I receive by hearsay [a˚ko¬Å
paralabovnteÍ] and then form our ideas of  shape and size and also other characteristics,
qualitative and quantitative, precisely as the mind forms its ideas from sense impres
sions [hJ diavnoia ejk tΩn a√sqhtΩn suntÇqhsi ta; nohtav]. . . . And serious students [o¥
filomaqe∂Í] proceed in just that way, trusting in, just as sense organs [a√sqhthrÇoiÍ],
those who have seen and traveled over places, some here, some there, and form in one
diagram their mental image of  the whole inhabited world.
41. It is significant that Polybius mentions Homer in the two most important methodological passages
in Book 12. For a lucid reading of  the two (which, however, ignores the Homeric references), see Schepens
1974.
42. See Dueck 2000, 47, and Engels 1999 on the methodological similarities between Polybius and Strabo.
43. Of  course, Polybius may have made such links explicit elsewhere in the lost portions of  his Histories
(e.g., Book 34). 
44. As Aujac (1966, 34) notes, the qualities by which Homer surpasses other poets arise directly from
his personality.
45. He clarifies this by claiming: “those who have traveled more than I in the western regions have not
covered as much ground in the east” and vice versa, “and the same holds true in regard to the regions to the
south and the north” (2.5.11).
46. 2.5.11: “I have traveled westward from Armenia as far as the regions of  Tyrrhenia opposite Sardinia,
and southward from the Euxine Sea as far as the frontiers of  Ethiopia.” On Strabo’s travels see Clarke
1999, 240–42; Engels 1999, 26–36; and Dueck 2000, 15–30.
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While Polybius perhaps saw himself  as an Odysseus, suffering the perils of
wanderings and war, Strabo seems to envision his own activity more in line
with Homer’s. His gesture towards secondhand witnesses could be seen on
the one hand as an apology for his own dependence on Homeric testimony, but
also accords with the Homeric rather than the Odyssean model of  inquiry
Homer did not experience, nor necessarily “see” everything himself  (a ref-
erence to his blindness?), but nevertheless did his best to learn them by in-
quiry. After all, Strabo asserts, “he who claims that only those who have seen
[tou;Í √dovntaÍ] have knowledge [e√devnai] destroys the criterion of  hearing
[a˚naire∂ to; thÅÍ a˚kohÅÍ krithvrion], which is much more important than sight
for science [h§tiÍ pro;Í ejpisthvmhn ojfqalmouÅ  polu;  kreÇttwn ejstÇ].”47
Strabo, Homer, and the Ideal Geographer
Instruction, Benefit, and Erudition (w˚fevleia and polumavqeia)
Near the end of  his defense of  Homer’s status as the first geographer, Strabo
pauses to pardon Homer’s practice of  “mixing some mythical things into
those told historically and instructively” (muq∫dh tina; prospevplektai to∂Í
legomevnoiÍ ¥storikΩÍ kaµ didaskalikΩÍ) and to record his disagreement with
Eratosthenes’ claim “that every poet aims at entertainment, not instruction”
(o§ti poihth;Í paÅÍ stocavzetai yucagwgÇaÍ, ou˚ didaskalÇaÍ, 1.1.10). He
promises to treat the matter in more detail at a later point and spends the
long second chapter of  Book 1 (1.2.1 40), the beginning of  which I will be
examining below, doing so. But for now I want to point out that these early
references, both to material that Homer narrates didaskalikΩÍ and to his
concern for “instruction” (didaskalÇa), allude to an integral part of  Strabo’s
portrait of  the poet, which we have not yet considered. Homer, as we recall,
directed his energies toward gaining as much knowledge as possible so that
he might “give an account [of  that knowledge] to those who came after
him” (kaµ parad∫sei to∂Í u§steron ejsomevnoiÍ, 1.1.2). This didactic desire
to transmit the historico-geographical knowledge acquired through travel,
inquiry, and industry to his audience for their benefit is another essential
element in Strabo’s vision of  Homer, because, as I will argue, it is so closely
linked to Strabo’s attempt to construct the ideal geographer.
To demonstrate this, we should turn back to 1.1.1, the paragraph imme-
diately preceding the Homeric portrait, where Strabo sets out three reasons
why he believes that geography is “the business of  the philosopher” (thÅÍ touÅ
filosovfou pragmateÇaÍ). The first is that all previous geographers have been
philosophers; the second, that geography requires polumavqeia (wide learning),
which “belongs to none other than the one who has examined both human
and divine affairs,” i.e., the philosopher; the third, because it aims at a goal
w˚fevleia poikÇlh (multifaceted utility) that “presupposes the same man,
the one who reflects upon the art of  life” (to;n frontÇzonta thÅÍ perµ to;n bÇon
47. In contrast to Polybius’ interest in autopsy and participation: Engels 1999, 157–65.
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tevcnhÍ, 1.1.1).48 The rest of  1.1 is devoted to explaining these three claims
as we have seen, his initial concern is to establish Homer as the first of  the
geographer-philosophers (1.1.2 11); he then moves on to specify the polu-
mavqeia necessary for the geographer (1.1.12 16) and the w˚fevleia that is his
object (1.1.17 23).49
Strabo’s treatment of  w˚fevleia and polumavqeia is essential to understanding
his definition of  geography and has often attracted scholarly interest.50 The
relationship of  these ideals in regard to his conception and interpretation
of  Homer, however, has rarely been examined, and then only in the most
general of  terms.51 This is odd, because his methodological remarks seem
to have clear connections both with the portrait of  Homer that precedes
them and with the long discussion of  Homeric poetry that follows in 1.2. On
the one hand, the lengthy analysis in 1.1.3 11 shows that Homer possessed
wide-ranging knowledge, and the portrait in 1.1.2 speaks of  his desire to
transmit this knowledge to posterity. Furthermore, even though Strabo’s sub-
sequent discussion of  w˚fevleia and polumavqeia is geared toward constructing
the ideal geographer of  his own day, he continues to cite Homer in support
of  his arguments,52 leading one to presume that Homer, as the founder of
geography, would also conform to Strabo’s guidelines. In this light, the
following chapter, 1.2, where Strabo upholds Homer’s geographical knowl-
edge and his poetry’s useful and instructional value against Eratosthenes,
looks like a defense of  Homer based precisely on the notions of  w˚fevleia and
polumavqeia that Strabo has just been discussing in 1.1.12 23. In what
follows, I want to demonstrate that Strabo’s defense of  Homer against
Eratosthenes in 1.2, rather than an independent excursus on poetic interpre-
tation, is part of  his larger concern to establish Homer not simply as the first
geographer, but as a man who had the same qualifications and intentions
(w˚fevleia and polumavqeia) as Strabo’s ideal geographer.
Instruction, Polymathy, Experience, and Utility
We should begin by outlining what exactly Strabo means by polumavqeia
and w˚fevleia, which he sees respectively as the prerequisite and objective of
geography. Polumavqeia comprises fluency in both celestial and terrestrial
matters, and in particular a mastery of  hJ ejpÇgeioÍ ¥storÇa, that is, knowledge
of  “what lives on the earth” (1.1.16). This “wide learning” required of  the
geographer corresponds to those things “useful [crhvsima] for the statesman
48. Strabo’s notion of  “philosophy”: French 1994, 123–30; Engels 1999, 40–44.
49. See Aujac and Lasserre 1969, 4–11, for a diagrammed breakdown of  Strabo’s argument in the Pro-
legomena (i.e., Books 1–2).
50. Van Paassen 1957, 1–32; Prontera 1984, 211–16; Biraschi 1988; Engels 1999, 90–102; Dueck 2000,
154–64.
51. For instance, Biraschi (1988) reconciles Strabo’s interest in Homer with his definition of  practical
“utility” aimed at statesmen by showing (with especial attention to 2.5.17) how Strabo believes that utility
also demands the inclusion of  traditional material such as Homeric geographical information; see further
below in the conclusion.
52. For instance, he speaks in 1.1.16 of  the demands that utility places upon a geographer and at 1.1.20
concerning the kind of  knowledge with which one should expect a geographer to be familiar.
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and the general,” whom Strabo imagines as his ideal readers (1.1.21).53
Strabo emphasizes the pragmatic cast of  this knowledge; geography, for the
most part, is geared towards political needs (pro;Í ta;Í creÇaÍ ta;Í politikavÍ),
and clearly bears upon the activities of  leaders; “for thus they can manage
their affairs in a more satisfactory manner, if  they know how large a country
is, how it lies, and what its peculiarities are” (1.1.16). Such a practical util-
ity is the standard by which geography must be measured (mevtron . . . thÅÍ
toiauvthÍ ejmpeirÇaÍ) and is illustrated with a series of  examples: the knowl-
edge of  the forest is essential to a hunter, just as a sure grasp of  the land
is to the leaders of  military expeditions.54 Utility is thus the overarching
aim of  the Geography; the geographer should direct his attention to “the
useful” (ta; crhvsima, 1.1.19), and Strabo’s work to; suvggramma, as he calls
it should be “useful alike to the statesman and the public at large” (de∂ kaµ
politiko;n kaµ dhmwfele;Í oJmoÇwÍ, 1.1.22).
How, then, does such a pragmatic, geographical sense of  polumavqeia and
w˚fevleia apply to Homer? In the section immediately following this outline
of  the ideal geographer, Strabo begins an extensive critique of  his prede-
cessors, from Eratosthenes to Posidonius, that stretches from 1.2 to 2.4. The
first item of  business, however, is a long and detailed defense of  Homer from
Eratosthenes’ contention that “poets aim at entertainment not instruction”
(stocavzesqai yucagwgÇaÍ, ou˚ didaskalÇaÍ, 1.2.3 = frag. 1A.20).55 Most
scholarship on this part of  the Geography treats it as if  it were an inde-
pendent excursus about the purpose of  poetry, linked to the long-standing
controversy over poetry’s claims to instruct its readers in everything from
morals and religion to technical knowledge.56 In his influential summary
of  this debate, Rudolf  Pfeiffer reflects a long-prevailing attitude, praising
Eratosthenes’ “fearless” and “scientific” declaration of  poetic autonomy, while
dismissing Strabo as a “Stoic ‘convert’ ” determined to defend Homer’s uni-
versal wisdom at any cost.57
To some degree Strabo provides grounds for such a characterization; he
quotes commonplaces of  Stoic poetic criticism and occasionally couches his
defense of  Homer in moralizing terms. Witness his opening remarks against
Eratosthenes (1.2.3):
53. As Biraschi (1988, 129–32) notes, Strabo envisions readers similar to those that Dionysius of  Hali-
carnassus describes in his Antiquitates Romanae; there are parallels also with Polybius, as is to be expected;
cf. Gabba 1982, 60: “Strabo distinguishes between the specialized scientist and the intelligent political
uses of  geographical doctrine.”
54. To put emphasis on the practical benefit of  geographical knowledge, Strabo points to famous military
expeditions that failed due to lack of  such information, from Agamemnon’s mistaken invasion of  Mysia (in
the belief  that it was Troy) to Crassus’ disastrous campaign against the Parthians.
55. Eratosthenes’ fragments are cited according to Berger 1880.
56. See Koster 1970, 143–51, on the ancient debate on the purpose of  poetry, and Hillgruber 1994, 1:5–35,
on the idea of  Homer as the source of  all knowledge; cf. Russell 1981, 84–98.
57. Pfeiffer 1968, 154, 166–68; cf. similar comments in the standard handbooks on ancient literary
criticism: Grube 1965, 128; Russell 1981, 42 and 95; Innes 1989, 272. De Lacy (1948) uncritically uses
Strabo as evidence for Stoic poetics; Walbank (1956–79, 3:577) thinks that Strabo sees Homer as the “pro-
totype of  the Stoic sofovÍ”; Russell and Winterbottom (1970, 300) introduce their translation of  1.2.3–9 as
“a statement of  the Stoic position about the didactic value of  poetry. . . .”
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The ancients, in contrast [to Eratosthenes], say that poetry is a sort of  primary philosophy,
which is supposed to introduce us to life from our childhood, and teach [didavskousan]
us about character, emotion, and action [hßqh kaµ pavqh kaµ pravxeiÍ] in a pleasurable way
[meq’ hJdonhÅÍ]. My own school [the Stoics] actually said that only the wise man could
be a poet [movnon poihth;n eßfasan eπnai to;n sofovn]. This is why Greek communities give
children their first education through poetry [pr∫tista dia; thÅÍ poihtikhÅÍ paideuvousin],
not for simple entertainment of  course, but for moral improvement [ou˚ yucagwgÇaÍ cavrin
dhvpouqen yilhÅÍ, a˚lla; swfronismouÅ].
First of  all, it should be pointed out that Strabo’s moralizing stance in this
passage is not strictly due to his Stoic allegiances (even if  it is compatible
with it), since he goes on to attribute this position also to the Pythagoreans
and the Peripatetic Aristoxenus.58 More significant, however, is the incon-
gruity of  this introductory passage with the thrust of  Strabo’s subsequent
claims. The abrupt transition to the next argument “But even apart from this,
Eratosthenes contradicts himself” (1.2.3) reflects the lack of  continuity with
the wholly geographically tinged discussion that follows. And indeed, as
Anna Maria Biraschi has observed, Strabo’s “philosophical” justifications
in this passage do not accord with his actual method of  defending Homer in
the latter portions of  the chapter (not to mention the rest of  the Geography),
where Homer is never interpreted in moralizing terms by Strabo nor imagined
as an ideal Stoic sage, but always treated strictly as a geographer.59 If  Strabo
chooses on occasion to have recourse to such familiar moralizing defenses
of  poetry’s instructional value, those comments should not necessarily be
taken as more indicative of  his poetic “beliefs” than his more consistent
pragmatic position expressed elsewhere.
As we have seen, Strabo has been envisioning Homer as an exemplar of
historiographical and geographical practice up to this point; any reference
to Homer’s “instructional” or “entertainment” aims should refer primarily
to his work not qua poetry, but qua geography. In fact, this whole section
(1.2.3 40) can be read in a largely geographical context, as directly linked
to the discussion of  the ideal geographer in 1.1 and dedicated to proving that
Homer not only knew a lot of  geographical, meteorological, and climatic
facts (polumavqeia), but that he intended to pass along this information to his
readers for their practical, rather than moral, benefit (w˚fevleia). A connection
between the didaskalÇa here in 1.2 and the w˚fevleia of  1.1.17 23 is already
58. Plutarch makes virtually the identical claims in Quomodo adul. 1 (14F). See Aly 1957, 376–85, for
a discussion of  possible sources. Strabo’s following citation of  Od. 3.267–70, on the aoidos left by Aga-
memnon to watch over Clytemnestra, is likewise paralleled in a wide range of  critics (see Gostoli 1986 and
Montanari 2001 on Demetrius of  Phalerum). This is not to say that Strabo did not consider himself  a Stoic,
nor that his geography is not informed by a Stoic view of  the world, but only that his understanding of  Homer
is not necessarily representative of  or consistent with Stoic poetics (Koster [1970, 144–45] calls it a mixture
of  Stoic and Peripatetic thought). On Strabo’s philosophical allegiances, see Aly 1964 and Aujac 1983.
59. Biraschi 1984, 152. The same could be said for some of  Strabo’s other excursuses, such as that at
the end of  1.2.5 discussed below, and 1.2.8, which veers off  into a theory of  myth that is incompatible with
Strabo’s understanding of  Homeric myth elsewhere. Following Floratos 1972, 60, Biraschi does, however,
see Strabo’s position as possessing affinities to that of  the oldest Stoics, emphasizing the unity of  wisdom
and the ties between philosophy, poetry, and science.
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evident in Strabo’s treatment of  the ideal geographer at 1.1.15, where he
states that the geographer must present things clearly and use things “for the
purposes of  instruction” (pro;Í th;n didaskalÇan) and 1.1.14, where he asks
“how [the geographer] can instruct correctly and adequately [kalΩÍ kaµ
¥kanΩÍ didavskoi] if  he has paid no attention, even superficially, to any of  these
matters?”60 These references to the objective and activity of  geographers as
“instruction” suggest a close relation with the more explicit geographical
goal of  “utility”; in essence, w˚fevleia is the expected result of  didaskalÇa.
If  we turn to his quarrel with Eratosthenes in 1.2, we witness Strabo
demonstrating the close association of  the two terms in his mind when he
mockingly paraphrases Eratosthenes’ original assertion on entertainment
and instruction (1.2.19 = frag. 1A.14):
. . . oJ ∆EratosqevnhÍ . . . fhsi to;n poihth;n bouvlesqai me;n ejn to∂Í prosesperÇoiÍ tovpoiÍ
th;n plavnhn tåÅ  ∆Odusse∂ poie∂n, a˚posthÅnai d’ a˚po; tΩn uÒpokeimevnwn ta; me;n ou˚k a˚kribΩÍ
pepusmevnon, ta; de; ou˚de; proelovmenon ou§ twÍ, a˚ll’  ejpµ to; deinovteron kaµ to; teratwdevs
teron e§kasta ejxavgein, touÅto me;n au˚to; eu® , to; d’ ou•  cavrin touÅt’ ejpoÇei kakΩÍ dexavmenoÍ:
ou˚ ga;r fluarÇaÍ, a˚ll’ w˚feleÇaÍ cavrin.
. . . Eratosthenes says . . . that the poet wished to represent Odysseus’ wanderings in far
western places, but abandoned this scheme, partly having gained inaccurate infor
mation, and partly not even having preferred to be accurate but rather to lead each inci
dent away toward the more awe inspiring and the more marvellous. Now Eratosthenes
understands well what Homer actually did, but wrongly his motive in doing it; it was
not for the sake of  nonsense, but for utility.
When Strabo claims that Homer wrote “not for the sake of  nonsense, but for
utility” (ou˚ ga;r fluarÇaÍ, a˚ll’ w˚feleÇaÍ cavrin), he is evidently substituting
the terms fluarÇa and w˚fevleia for Eratosthenes’ entertainment (yucagwgÇa)
and instruction (didaskalÇa) (cf. 1.2.18).
This passage also demonstrates that the debate revolved around more than
simply Homer’s knowledge of  geographical matters. On most issues, Strabo
and Eratosthenes agree on Homer’s geographical accuracy, but differ over
why he chose to be accurate (ou• cavrin touÅt’ ejpoÇei). Such a divergence over
Homer’s intentions can be located right at the beginning of  the dispute in
1.2.3. Eratosthenes, according to Strabo, had admitted that “Homer had
found room in his poetry for what he had found out about Ethiopia and
Egypt and Libya, and went into extraordinary detail on Greece and adjacent
areas . . .” (1.2.3 = frag. 1A.4). Strabo cannot understand how Eratosthenes
admits this yet denies that Homer included such information for instruc-
tional purposes.61 While Eratosthenes sees Homer’s geographical accuracy
60. Geographers are also referred to as “instructing” at 1.1.12: “Hipparchus and Eratosthenes instruct
[didavskei] that it is impossible for any man . . . to attain to the requisite knowledge of  geography, without . . .”
61. “Well, is the poet who does this [i.e., introducing correct geographical information] offering enter-
tainment or instruction? Instruction, of  course . . .” (povteron ou® n oJ poiΩn tauÅ ta yucagwgouÅ nti eßoiken h˙
didavskonti; nh; DÇa . . . , Str. 1.2.3); see Meijering 1987, 58–59. I should note that my concern is not with
Eratosthenes’ view of  Homeric poetry, but with how Strabo polemically interprets that view.
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as incidental to his poetic aims, it is essential for Strabo not only that Homer
included correct facts, but that he had an instructional, useful goal in mind
as well. Homer, like the ideal geographer, aims at w˚fevleia.62
The close relation of  Homer’s knowledge, instruction, and concern for
utility is best demonstrated by Strabo’s arguments on behalf  of  Homer’s
instruction in the sections (1.2.3 5) that immediately follow this passage.
Eratosthenes had offered two specific criticisms: first he had asked “what
does it contribute to the excellence of  a poet [pro;Í a˚reth;n poihtouÅ] to have
experience [eßmpeiron] of  many places, generalship, farming, rhetoric or what-
ever it is that people have wanted to secure [peripoie∂n] for him?” (1.2.3 =
frag. 1A.21); he had then gone on to declare that “poetry is a fable-mongering
old woman, to whom it has been allowed to invent . . . whatever she deems
suitable for entertainment” (th;n poihtikh;n gra∫dh muqologÇan a˚pofaÇnwn,
¬• devdotai plavttein . . . o¶ a˙n au˚t¬Å faÇnhtai yucagwgÇaÍ o√ke∂on, 1.2.3 =
frag. 1A.19). In his initial response, Strabo concedes that Homer should
not be granted all knowledge, but maintains that Eratosthenes is wrong to
“deprive Homer of  so much polumavqeia.”63 This rephrasing of  Eratosthenes’
accusation as a specific attack on Homer’s polumavqeia suggests that Strabo
is thinking about the argument in terms of  his just concluded discussion in
1.1,64 a suggestion confirmed in Strabo’s vehement conclusion to 1.2.3:
Is no contribution made towards the excellence [ou˚de;n sumbavlletai pro;Í a˚rethvn] of
the poets’ audiences? I mean his having experience of  many places [levgw de; to; pollΩn
uÒpavrxai tovpwn eßmpeiron], generalship, farming or rhetoric, which listening, as is likely,
secures [in the audience] [a§per hJ a˚krovasiÍ, . . . wJÍ e√kovÍ, peripoie∂].65
Eratosthenes’ criticism of  poets’ being “experienced” (eßmpeiroÍ) has struck
a chord with Strabo, for whom, as we have seen, ejmpeirÇa is an essential
part of  Homer’s character.66 Strabo links such knowledge based on “ex-
perience” to Homer’s capacity as an instructor at the beginning of  1.2.5,
when he speaks of  “the whole educated world which trusts his evidence as
62. Koster (1970, 145) discusses w˚fele∂n in Str. 1.2, but takes it in a moral sense.
63. Strabo remarks that trying “to assign [peripoie∂n] every art and all knowledge [paÅn mavqhma kaµ paÅsan
tevcnhn] to him would be the act of  a man whose zeal brings him to grief.” This explicit criticism of  the
conception of  Homer as the source of  all knowledge is another sign that Strabo’s position is more compli-
cated than Pfeiffer and others would have it. In a similar fashion, Strabo thought it ridiculous to assume
that everything, even nonfantastic episodes such as the battle with the suitors, happened in the Odyssey
exactly as described (1.2.11).
64. Cf. 1.2.20: “Again, in the case of  the climata and of  the winds, Homer displays his wide learning
concerning geography” (to; polumaqe;Í to; perµ th;n gewgrafÇan).
65. As his examples show, Strabo here takes a˚rethv to mean not moral excellence or virtue (as Floratos
1972, 61, claims), but strictly practical skill; Biraschi (1984) sees Strabo’s understanding of  a˚rethv differ-
ently, as retaining a moral sense separate from the technical notion of  “virtue,” a distinction, moreover,
that orthodox Stoics would not have maintained; on this distinction, see also Aujac 1969. Eratosthenes, on
the other hand, seems to be referring to poetic excellence in a more Aristotelian sense, although there is no
way to be sure.
66. Strabo formulates Eratosthenes’ accusation even more clearly at 1.2.12 = frag. 1A.12: “He declares
that all poets are dealers in absurdities [poihthvn te a§panta a˚pofhvnaÍ fluvaron] and thinks that their knowl-
edge either of  places or technai [kaµ mhvte tovpwn ejmpeirÇan mhvte tecnΩn] does not conduce to excellence
[pro;Í a˚reth;n sunteÇnein nomÇsaÍ].”
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embodying right judgement on the great contribution to wisdom made by
such experience” (pavnteÍ o¥ pepaideumevnoi mavrturi crΩntai tåÅ  poiht¬Å
wÒÍ ojrqΩÍ levgonti perµ touÅ th;n toiauvthn ejmpeirÇan e√Í frovnhsin sunteÇnein
mavlista).
The focus on “experience” lies at the heart of  the next argument as well
and connects Homer’s polumavqeia with his concern for w˚fevleia. At 1.2.5,
Strabo maintains that there is no “poetic excellence” (a˚reth;n poihtouÅ)
better than Homer’s “skill to represent life by the medium of  words” (th;n
mimhtikh;n touÅ  bÇou dia; lovgwn). This mimetic talent, however, is explicitly
tied to Homer’s life experience in a formulation reminiscent of  Polybius:
“How,” Strabo asks, “can [Homer] represent [mimo∂to], if  he is inexperienced
in life [aßpeiroÍ w˙n touÅ bÇou] and foolish?”67 Moreover, Homer’s unparalleled
mimetic ability is assumed to have “utility” as its goal; in another paraphrase
of  Eratosthenes, Strabo wonders how a poet so skillful at representation
could be “only capable of  bewitching and cajoling [gohteuvein movnon kaµ
kolakeuvein] his audience and not benefiting them [w˚fele∂n de; mhdevn]?” The
language of  this section (polumavqeia, eßmpeiroÍ, aßpeiroÍ, w˚fele∂n) indicates
that we are indeed still in the conceptual realm of  the intrepid Homer and
the ideal geographer. Seen in this light, even Strabo’s Stoicizing aphoristic
remark at the conclusion of  1.2.5 that only a good man can be a good
poet (ou˚c o∏ovn te a˚gaqo;n genevsqai poihth;n mh; provteron genhqevnta aßndra
a˚gaqovn) could be taken in a more “technical” way, rather than as an example
of  his moralizing tendencies. The excellence of  a poet, as we have seen,
refers to his mimetic, not his moral, excellence; since mimetic ability is the
result of  experience, the “poet” and the “man” are “good” inasmuch as they
are experienced.68
Strabo’s opening remarks in 1.2.3 5, then, answer Eratosthenes’ general
questioning of  Homer’s knowledge and instructive intent as if  he were spe-
cifically impugning the polumavqeia and w˚fevleia proper to the geographer.
In this light, Strabo’s positing of  entertainment and instruction as Homer’s
goals, his pragmatic sense of  “utility,” and his vigorous defense of  Homeric
didaskalÇa have a consistent basis in his understanding of  Homer’s role as
an ideal geographer.69 When Eratosthenes casts doubt on Homer’s concern
for “instruction,” he undermines Homer’s fulfillment of  the “utility” that forms
the ideal geographer’s primary goal. Eratosthenes’ attack on Homer thus goes
to the heart of  Strabo’s conception of himself  and his own geographical
67. Halliwell (2002, p. 270, with n. 21) sees this as an implicit response to Pl. Resp. 10.598–600, pre-
sumably transmitted via Hellenistic sources.
68. Alternatively, one could see the last sentence of  1.2.5, in which Strabo, backtracking, differentiates
poetic virtue from that of  a carpenter, “which depends on no inherent nobility or dignity, whereas the ex-
cellence of  a poet is inseparably associated with the excellence of  the man himself,” as another of  Strabo’s
attempts to frame his arguments in Stoicizing terms that are nevertheless starkly incompatible with his focus
on Homer’s technical knowledge and experience.
69. Strabo devotes 1.2.8–9 to developing his idea of  Homer’s dual purpose of  entertainment and in-
struction with his well-known excursus on the origins of  myths, while much of  the ensuing discussion of
Odysseus’ wanderings (1.2.10–19) further explicates Strabo’s method of  separating “entertaining myth”
from “instructive history” in counterpoint to Eratosthenes and Polybius.
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project; Strabo’s defense, while far from satisfactory in its frequent digres-
sions, confusions, and prolixity, is not simply a long-winded apology for
Homer’s knowledge of  geography, but a defense of  the principles of  geog-
raphy itself  as embodied in the founder of  the science. For Strabo being a
proper geographer is not simply a matter of  getting the facts right, but
having the right attitude; as a result Eratosthenes’ claim that Homer had
no concern for instruction and did not even have the experience and knowl-
edge to impart such instruction had to be refuted at all costs.
YucagwgÇa, didaskalÇa, and w˚fevleia in Historiography
Strabo’s debate with Eratosthenes can thus be seen as deeply connected to his
ideas about Homer and geography. This should not really come as a surprise.
Although many scholars have recognized that the language employed by
Strabo and Eratosthenes yucagwgÇa, didaskalÇa, w˚fevleia is paralleled
in ancient literary criticism, we should remember that Strabo’s argument with
Eratosthenes takes place in a geographical context. Like Strabo, Eratosthenes
had made his comments on poetry in the first book of  his Geographica, not
in his philological work.70 In fact, the only writers other than Strabo to
mention any of  Eratosthenes’ allegedly “famous” bons mots on poetry are
Hipparchus and Polybius, who were both responding to Eratosthenes’ Geog-
raphy, and who, moreover, are preserved only in Strabo. The closest allusion
to, or reformulation of, Eratosthenes’ statement occurs in another geographical
work, Agatharchides of  Cnidus’ On the Erythraean Sea: “Every poet aims
at entertainment rather than truth” (paÅÍ poihth;Í yucagwgÇaÍ maÅllon h˙
a˚lhqeÇaÍ ejstµ stocasthvÍ).71 Whatever their origin or relation to literary-
critical discussions, Eratosthenes’ comments thus seem to have been pri-
marily targeted at and received by those interested in Homeric geography.72
But Strabo was a historian before he became a geographer, and, as we have
seen in the first half  of  this article, he owes much of  his picture of  Homer
to historiographical terms and concepts. I want to close this section by ex-
ploring the possibility that Strabo’s ideas about Homeric instruction, utility,
and entertainment owe something to discussions of  these notions in historio-
graphical discourse. After all, Strabo explicitly declares that the Geography
can be compared to his History, which he similarly conceives as “useful”
(crhvsima),73 and his emphasis on geography’s utility derives from histori-
ography, where it had become virtually de rigueur to proclaim the usefulness
70. Geus (2002, 264–67), who perhaps goes too far in removing Eratosthenes from the field of  literary
debate completely: “the single statement in the Geographica suggests an exaggerated formulation, rather
than a carefully thought-out debate with older and contemporary philologists . . . the so-called Dichtungs-
theorie of  Eratosthenes is scarcely more than an empty formula” (p. 267).
71. Agatharchides frag. 8 = Phot. Bibl. 250.8, 444b. See Fraser 1972, 548, and Verdin 1990.
72. This is not to say that literary-critical principles stated by geographers have no relation to formulations
of  those working on Homeric or poetic criticism (like Aristarchus and Crates, who also often weighed in
on Homeric geography, or Philodemus), only that they necessarily are adapted to the geographical context
of  the discussion.
73. 1.1.23. Strabo envisions a similar audience for both works: the Geography “is addressed to the
same class of  readers and particularly to men of  exalted stations in life” (1.1.23) as his historical work.
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of  one’s work since the days of  Thucydides.74 The “utility” of  history, how-
ever, could be construed in a number of  different ways. Diodorus, for instance,
speaks of  his history’s usefulness in a moral sense,75 and the primary “utility”
of  history for Dionysius of  Halicarnassus seems to have lain in its ability to
provide exempla for rhetorical speeches.76 Strabo’s “practical” idea of  utility,
however, is indebted to Polybius,77 who not only consistently takes w˚fevleia
in a similarly pragmatic fashion, but also repeatedly stresses the practical
benefit of  his history to his readers.78
Polybius also provides the best parallels for Strabo’s vocabulary of  enter-
tainment, instruction, and utility. Compare his famous formulation of  the
difference between tragedy and history (2.56.11 12):
The tragic poet should thrill and entertain his audience for the moment [ejkplhÅxai kaµ
yucagwghÅsai kata; to;n paro;n tou;Í a˚kouvontaÍ] by very persuasive speeches, but the
historian should instruct and persuade serious students [didavxai kaµ pe∂sai tou;Í
filomaqouÅntaÍ] for all time by true facts and speeches, since in the one case it is the
probable that takes precedence, even if  it be untrue, the purpose being to create illusion
in spectators [dia; th;n a˚pavthn tΩn qewmevnwn], in the other it is the truth, the purpose
being to confer benefit on serious students [dia; th;n w˚fevleian tΩn filomaqouvntwn].
Polybius’ parallel sentence structure sets up an opposition between the tragic
poets’ concern to ejkplhÅxai kaµ yucagwghÅsai and the historians’ to didavxai
kaµ pe∂sai as well as their respective purposes: a˚pavth and w˚fevleia. We thus
have yucagwgÇa arrayed on the one side and w˚fevleia and didaskalÇa on the
other in a fashion that corresponds with Strabo’s usage.79 While this example
assigns one set of  terms to tragedy and the other to history, Polybius uses
yucagwgÇa and w˚fevleia similarly when he is talking about history on its own;
for instance, during his criticism of  Timaeus, he explains that historians
must supply both facts and explanations, “for the mere statement of  a fact
may entertain us but is of  no benefit to us” (ejpeµ yilΩÍ legovmenon au˚to;
to; gegono;Í yucagwge∂ mevn, w˚fele∂ d’ ou˚devn, 12.25b.2).80 In the same vein,
Polybius asserts elsewhere that the study of  causes is “what at one and the
74. Thuc. 1.22.4: “it will be sufficient if  those wishing to have a clear idea of  the past as an aid to the
interpretation of  the future . . . judge my history as useful [w˚fevlima]”; for the evidence, Avenarius 1956,
22–26.
75. Diodorus, writing shortly before Strabo, defines history as a˚kÇndunon didaskalÇan (risk-free instruc-
tion) that aims to present tΩn crhsÇmwn, “useful” things (1.1). See Sacks 1990, 23–35, for a nuanced treat-
ment of  Diodorus’ particular understanding of  moral utility and its relation to that of  Ephorus.
76. Although cf. Pomp. 6.734, cited below. For Dionysius, see Verdin 1974.
77. Prontera 1984, 211–16; Biraschi 1988; Dueck 2000, 47 and 162. On Polybius’ “pragmatic” attitude,
see Walbank 1990 and Sacks 1981, 133–44; on Strabo’s notion of  utility in relation to Polybius, see Dueck
2000, 47–48; and Biraschi 1988 on Strabo, Polybius, and Dionysius.
78. E.g., Polybius’ sort of  “political history” is w˚felim∫taton at 9.2.6 and history’s telos is wÒfevleia at
15.36.3. See Sacks 1981, 120–44, on utility in Polybius (list of  occurences of  wjfel- words: p. 122, n. 1);
his analysis of  the benefit stemming from the proper use of  emphasis provides another link between utility,
history, and Homer, whom Polybius sees as particularly skilled at emphasis.
79. Cf. Meijering 1987, 10–11.
80. Cf. 11.19a.2: “the results of  actions only entertain [yucagwge∂] one’s audience, while the anticipation
of  what is to follow, when investigated properly, benefits serious students [w˚felouÅsi tou;Í filomaqouÅntaÍ].”
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same time delights and benefits serious students” (to; yucagwgouÅn a§ma kaµ
th;n w˚fevleian ejpifevron to∂Í filomaqouÅsi, 6.2.8).
In each of  these cases, Polybius shows that the conceptual pairing of
yucagwgÇa and w˚fevleia had historiographical currency, but the last quote
also indicates that Strabo’s compromise claim that Homer strove both to
instruct and to entertain could directly apply to historiographical activity
here to the study of  historical causes. Strabo’s formulation, however, has
always been treated as part of  the history of  poetic criticism, in which the
dual view of  poetry’s requirement to benefit and delight has a long history.81
Many scholars have pointed out the similarity of  Strabo’s position with those
of  Neoptolemus of  Parium (third or second century b.c.e.) and, to a lesser
extent, Heraclides Ponticus (fourth century b.c.e.), criticized in Philodemus’
On Poems 5, written not long before Strabo’s time. Both Heraclides and
Neoptolemus seem to have subscribed to a version of  Strabo’s thesis that a
poet both pleases and instructs, in language that corresponds to Strabo’s.82
But as Philodemus’ criticisms of  both writers demonstrates, neither specified
precisely what sort of  benefit is bestowed by a poet’s instructive objectives;
Strabo’s narrowing of  the scope to practical geographical utility demonstrates
that even if  he was aware of  such work, he has elaborated it for his own par-
ticular purposes.83 Moreover, Polybius’ remarks quoted above show that the
linking of  entertainment and utility was already so familiar that it could be
used of  virtually any activity (e.g., studying causes or historical facts), rather
than poetry per se.84
So Dionysius of  Halicarnassus, a contemporary of  Strabo, conceives
of  Theopompus’ historical work as having the same dual objective: “And
nobody should suppose that this is purely for entertainment [yucagwgÇan]:
this is not the case, but the material contained in it is virtually all for our
benefit [w˚fevleian]” (Pomp. 6.4). Polybius also identifies two “ends”
(tevlh) w˚fevleia and tevryiÍ for all intellectual pursuits, but especially
history (15.36.3), and frequently lists utility and pleasure as the two ends of
81. See, e.g., Hor. Ars. P. 333–34; 343–44. Cf. Pl. Resp. 10.607d: “not only pleasant but also beneficial
for states and human life” (ou˚ movnon hJde∂a a˚lla; kaµ w˚felÇmh pro;Í ta;Í politeÇaÍ kaµ to;n bÇon to;n a˚nqr∫pinon).
Earlier Plato differentiates between moral and technical utility, and requires only the moral kind of  the
poet (10.599b–d).
82. Neoptolemus’ formulation, though fragmentary, is closest to Strabo’s, and has often been compared
to it: “. . . for the perfect poet along with his entertaining qualities to benefit his hearers and tell them
useful things, and that Homer . . .” (t]åÅ  teleÇå poi[ht¬Å met]a; thÅÍ yucagw[gÇ]a[Í th;n tΩn] a˚kouovntw[n]
w˚[fevlhsi]n kaµ crhsi[mo]l[ogÇa]n kaµ to;n £Omhr[on . . . , Philodemus On Poems 5, col. xvi.9–15 Mangoni;
trans. Armstrong 1995). Note that Mangoni’s text is significantly different from Jensen’s, usually cited in
this context. In fact, although the dating of  both writers remains uncertain, many (Pfeiffer 1968, 166–67;
Meijering 1987, 6; Kennedy 1989, 206) have assumed that Neoptolemus’ remarks are a direct riposte to
Eratosthenes. As my earlier remarks demonstrate, I believe this to be unlikely. Heraclides seems to have
espoused an almost identical position as Neoptolemus and also to have required the poet to know geography
(Philodemus On Poems 5, col. v. 27 Mangoni). See Asmis 1995 for a lucid attempt to reconstruct the positions
of  Heraclides, Neoptolemus, and Philodemus.
83. Asmis 1995, 149–51.
84. In fact, the formulation might have been older; cf. Halliwell (2002, pp. 269–70, n. 19), who points
to some lesser known possible parallels: Isoc. 2.49 and 9.10, [Pl.] Minos 321a, Timocles frag. 6.6 PCG.
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history.85 Roos Meijering’s pithy appraisal of  Strabo’s view of  Homer
namely, that his “final goal is didaskalÇa, or, in other words, to; tevrpein
must serve to; w˚fele∂n” could reasonably be Polybius’ appraisal of  his
own historical work.86 At 1.2.18 Strabo even describes Homer’s “utility” as
historical: “we should neither scrutinize rigorously Homer’s stories of  . . .
Scylla, Charybdis, and Aeolus nor set them aside as baseless and . . . as
having no claim to truthfulness or to historical utility” (a˚lhqeÇaÍ mhde;n
prosaptovmena mhd’ w˚feleÇaÍ ¥storikhÅÍ). These parallels suggest that Strabo’s
thinking about the relation between benefit, instruction, and entertainment
and his notion of  Homer’s dual objectives resonate as much with historians’
formulation of  history’s purpose as with the literary-critical discussion of
poetry’s. After all, while Strabo acknowledges that Homer was indeed a poet,
we have seen that he consistently treats him as a historian and geographer:
a man who “looks to the same end as the historian and the one speaking
the facts” (pro;Í de; to; au˚to; tevloÍ tåÅ ¥storikåÅ kaµ tåÅ ta; oßnta levgonti
blevpwn, 1.2.9).87
Conclusion
Strabo’s decision to focus on Homer’s historico-geographical zeal and his
instructional objectives takes on an essential role in his own work that goes
beyond simply acknowledging Homer’s position as both “author of  the first
and greatest periegetic composition,” and the founder of  geography.88 The
Geography constitutes Strabo’s attempt to forge a new type of  universal
geography to describe the changed world of  the late Hellenistic period. In
doing so he builds upon the geographical literature of  the past periegeses,
universal histories, mathematical geographies while disavowing the ability
of  any one of  those to adequately treat his more expansive understanding of
geography, one which is simultaneously historical, descriptive, and normative.
Strabo’s work dictates both what geography has been and what it must be,
both who geographers were in the past and who they must be in the future.89
Within such a framework, I propose, Strabo pays so much attention to
sketching Homer’s attitude and intentions because he is making a conscious
effort to renew the tradition by “returning” to the Homeric model of  inquiry,
not only in terms of  content both geographical and historical in equal
85. In 1.4.11, he says that only by studying universal history can we “receive to; crhvsimon kaµ to; terpno;n
from history,” and at 7.7.8, he describes an episode of  his work as “more pleasurable [hJdÇwn] to those fond
of  tales [filhkovoiÍ] and more useful [crhsim∫teroÍ] to those who want to learn.” Moreover, just as in
Strabo, the pleasure or entertainment of  history is usually subordinate to its utility. On Polybius’ views of
this matter, see Walbank 1990.
86. Meijering 1987, 6.
87. Strabo does of  course realize that Homer was a poet; he argues, however, in 1.2.6–8 that he only
wrote in verse because prose did not yet exist. Space precludes me from discussing the difficult question
of  the place of  myth in Strabo’s conception of  Homeric composition, which to some extent is the content
that corresponds to the goal of  entertainment or pleasure in history and poetry. I hope to do so in a future
contribution.
88. Clarke 1999, 334.
89. Prontera 1984, 211–16; cf. Clarke 1999, 294–99.
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measure but in terms of  the coherence bestowed upon that content by the
character of  the inquirer.90 To cast doubt on Homer’s accuracy, then, would
also call into question Homer’s desire for truth. I hope to have shown that
a consistent portrait of  Homer lies behind Strabo’s use of  Homeric poetry in
the Geography, depicting a man who, in his zeal for travel, knowledge, and
instruction bears a great resemblance both to the model historian outlined
by Polybius in his Histories and to the ideal geographer set out by Strabo in his
preface. Even his lengthy defense of  Homer from Eratosthenes’ accusations
can be seen as part of  this vision, through its emphasis on Homer’s concern
for the utility so central to Strabo’s conception of  both historical and geo-
graphical inquiry. Strabo insists not only that Homer was correct, but that he
wanted to be correct, not only that he was content to hear about things, but
that he had made an effort to verify such information and to pass it on to his
audience. Such a conception of  Homer lies at the heart of  Strabo’s deploy-
ment of  Homeric poetry as evidence throughout the rest of  the Geography and
suggests an attitude very different from that of  other ancient Homeric exegetes,
who posit Homer’s words as a priori authoritative or “scriptural,” whether in
moral, scientific, or other terms. Homer retains his authoritative status, but
is given occupational specificity Strabo envisions a Homer endowed with
all the qualities of  the best historian and geographer, and this fashioning of
Homer in his own image is a striking testament to the poet’s continuing
power in Greek intellectual life.
James Porter has pointed out how Homer’s canonicity in Western culture
has always strangely been tied to his lack of  identity; the mystery surrounding
this founder of  literature has made him something of  a blank slate on which
people can project their own fantasies, desires, or fears.91 While Homer’s
status and centrality compelled writers, poets, and artists to grapple with him,
his fundamental emptiness meant that those who came after him were free
to imagine him in ways suited to their intellectual projects, whether casting
him as authority or disavowing him. Each of  these treatments, however, is
necessarily particular and different because Homer himself  was not a stable
identity. Furthermore, as Barbara Graziosi’s Inventing Homer has dem-
onstrated, writers who discussed and constructed Homer’s life were neces-
sarily engaged in interpretive interventions because the details of  Homer’s
life could only be inferred from his poetry, to write Homer’s biography was
also to say something about his poetry.92 For Strabo, as for every ancient
author who thought about Homer, the poet was not a static figure with stable
characteristics inherited from tradition; to properly engage with Homer meant
taking a stance as to who he was, what he stood for to construct an image
of  Homer out of  his poetry, the biographical lore, and one’s own desire.93
University of Texas at Austin
90. Cf. Bruno Sunseri 1997 on Ephorus’ “return to Homer.”
91. Porter 2002.
92. Graziosi 2002.
93.  I would like to thank Jim Porter and Egbert Bakker for reading and commenting on an early version
of  this article.
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